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1. INTRODUCTION   
 
Following the burgeoning empirical research on economic growth in the 
last twenty years, a vast quantity of literature has analysed the impact of fiscal 
policy on economic growth without showing evidence of strong and 
unequivocal support (Levine and Renelt, 1992; Nijkamp and Poot, 2004; 
Slemrod, 1995).  
Public infrastructure, communication and information systems, 
government-funded education and research and development are the most 
often cited examples of publicly provided goods which contribute positively to 
aggregate production (Ram, 1986; Aschauer, 1989; Morrison and Schwartz, 
1996). 
On the other hand observations in most developed countries that growth 
in the government spending is accompanied by a slowing of income growth, 
has given rise to the hypothesis that  government size has a negative impact on 
economic performance. A large government is detrimental to growth because 
it tends to crowd out private investment. Over burdensome tax regimes, in 
combination with  a system of publicly-mediated transfers, also distort market 
incentives and have a negative impact on the overall productivity of the 
economy (Milesi-Feretti and Roubini, 1998; Barro, 1997). 
 In the original neoclassical growth model introduced by Solow (1956) 
and Swan (1956), there is no government sector and hence no room for 
directly analysing the effects of fiscal policy on the growth rate. The long run 
growth rate of the economy is determined exclusively by the rate of exogenous 
technological change and population growth.  
In their seminal contribution, Arrow and Kurz (1969) develop a 
neoclassical model of growth where aggregate production benefits from public 
capital services and government finances public capital by levying a 
proportional income tax, subtracting resources from private agents (see also 
Fisher and Turnovsky, 1998). This twofold influence implies a non-linear 
relationship between government size and growth (as in Bajo-Rubio, 2000). 
When the share of total government spending (or taxes) is below a certain 
threshold of the GDP, any expansion of public spending raises growth. 
Conversely, further increases in taxes hamper growth. Given the properties of 
diminishing returns to private and public capital, the impact of government 
policy is limited to the transition path to the steady state to which the 
economy converges in the long run. 
Dissatisfaction with this lack of relationship between policy interventions 
and long run growth is one of the factors that led to the surge of endogenous 
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growth theories in the late Eighties (Romer, 1994; Solow, 1994). The first 
contribution in this area is the work of Barro (1990) who develops a model 
where government plays an active role in influencing long run growth (see also 
Corsetti and Roubini, 1996, for a generalization). All government spending is 
implicitly productive, it complements private inputs and it is included in the 
production function. The model determines the optimal level of public 
spending, using a non-monotonic relationship between government size and 
growth. Given the absence of diminishing returns to capital, endogenous 
models allow government to permanently influence economic growth. 
Lee (1992) and Devarajan et al (1996) expand on Barro’s model, allowing 
different kinds of government expenditures to have different impacts on 
growth. Employing the traditional distinction between productive and non-
productive spending (Glomm and Ravikumar, 1997; Kneller et al, 1999), they 
are able to determine the optimal composition of different kinds of 
expenditures, based on their relative elasticities. Following a similar line, Chen 
(2006) investigates the optimal composition of public spending and its 
relationship to economic growth. He derives the optimal productive public 
service share of the total government budget and the optimal public 
consumption share, which is determined by policy and structural parameters. 
In this paper we develop an extended neoclassical growth model. It has 
become widely accepted that the Solow (1956) model, augmented by the 
inclusion of other productive factors in addition to private capital and labour, 
is able to explain cross-country differences in growth rates of per capita 
income (Mankiw et al., 1992; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Nonneman and 
Vanhoudt, 1996). At the same time most of the empirical literature on fiscal 
policy and growth is not based on an explicit theoretical framework, adding 
only a proxy of the size of the public sector (usually government 
consumption) in an ad hoc manner to a standard growth equation. Fiscal policy 
instruments are included in growth models from the perspective of 
endogenous growth.  
Along with these considerations this work tries to supply a theoretical 
framework which can be applied in empirical studies. The model developed 
here determines optimal government size and the optimal mix of government 
expenditures which maximize the rate of growth and the long run level of per 
capita income. We focus on transitional dynamics to the steady state. There is, 
indeed, a empirical consensus on the fact that the process of convergence 
towards the steady state may take many years to play itself out (Barro and Sala-
I-Martin, 1992; Islam, 2003). Finally one important conclusion of this work is 
that neglecting the characteristics of non linearity of public spending and the 
different impact different types of government have on growth results in 
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mispecified models which bias traditional empirical analysis (Slemrod, 1995; 
Kneller et al., 1999). 
Fiscal policy is aimed at creating different kinds of public capital through 
accumulation. We divide public capital into two components. Both provide 
flows of services in proportion to the stocks which form part of the aggregate 
production function along with private capital, labour, and exogenous labour-
augmenting technological progress. Government can influence growth by 
deciding the extent of its intervention (expressed as a percentage of GDP) and 
by deciding on the allocation of its resources in the two different components 
of public capital.  
Public services are considered complementary to private inputs and are 
highly competitive with each other. The rival characteristics of government 
services, such as roads and ports, make the infrastructure less useful to private 
agents as more producers use the facilities. This impedes strong externality 
effects, and rules out the possibility of constant or increasing returns on 
capital. Given the properties of diminishing returns on public capital, any 
effect of policy on growth tends to disappear in the long run. This makes this 
work different from endogenous models where diminishing returns do not 
arise when government services grow along with private capital, in the same 
way as aggregate capital or human capital compensate private capital (Romer, 
1986 and Lucas, 1988; Barro, 1990).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents 
the core model. Section 3 develops indications for the maximization of public 
policies. In section 4 we discuss the implications of the model and compare it 
with other theories. Conclusions are presented in section 5. 
 
2. THE MODEL 
 
In this section we model the effects of fiscal policy on growth as a part of 
the aggregate economy, within an augmented neoclassical framework. We 
explicitly include the public sector in the production function. This generates a 
potential relationship between government and growth. The introduction of 
government as a distinct input is based on the rationale that government 
services are not a substitute for private factors, and resources cannot be easily 
transferred from one sector to another.. As does Cashin (1994), we consider 
rival, non-excludable public services which would not be provided by the 
market due to the difficulty of implementing charges for their use. The rival 
characteristics of public services impedes the presence of externalities, 
allowing us to overlook congestion issues. 
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Although, for simplicity of analysis, most recent literature specifies 
productive government services as a proportion of the flow of current 
expenditures (Turnovsky and Fisher, 1995), we employ public capital stock. 
We follow Arrow and Kurz (1969) by considering all government spending as 
an accumulation process designed to create productive public capital (Glaeser 
et al., 2004). Public capital goods provide flows of services proportional to the 
relative stocks and enter the production function together with private capital, 
labour, and exogenous labour-augmenting technological change.  
The accumulation of physical capital (normally determined only by the 
share of investment in GDP) is one of the main forces determining the level 
of real output per capita. The idea here is that government can influence 
private capital accumulation through the tax rate, and public capital  
accumulation through public expenditure. Government can decide the 
composition of its spending while it cannot directly change the amount of 
public capital stock. This latter can only be changed through an accumulation 
process deriving from public investment decisions.  
We consider all government activities as production-enhancing goods. 
Following Aschauer (1989) and Baffes and Shah (1998), we allow different 
types of public capital to have different impacts on economic performance. 
Core infrastructure (such as roads and highways, infrastructure, 
telecommunication systems, R&D capital stock) might have a larger impact on 
overall output than have other public types of capital (such as law and order, 
health, education, social security, distribution of wealth and public 
administration services in general). The different impact of each type of 
government service on productivity makes it all the more necessary to 
disaggregate the public budget into its various components. 
 
Aggregate production and public capital 
 
Production of output Y is specified in a Cobb-Douglas form: 
(1)  ( ) 2121 211 γγγγαα GGP KKLEKY −−−=
where KP is private capital stock, L is total employment, E is labour-
augmenting Harrod-neutral technology and KG is public-sector or government 
capital. Elasticities are bounded between 0 and 1 implying positive but 
diminishing returns to single inputs. Constant returns to scale are assumed 
such that 0 < α + γ1 + γ2 < 1. 
We differentiate public capital into two categories. The first (KG1) is 
traditional core productive capital. The second (KG2) is a broad concept of 
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capital, namely “institutional” capital embracing all the activities which are 
designed to improve the environment in which firms can effectively operate 
(Glaeser et al, 2004). Both components of government expenditure are 
complementary with private production. 
Public capital elasticities differ according to their productivity. In the case 
of γ1 = γ2 we consider a general concept of public capital, with all 
contributions to production the same across different components. In such a 
case, the composition of government expenditure would not affect the rate of 
economic growth. 
The accumulation of public capital builds on  two conflicting aspects of 
government spending (G). One is a detrimental effect, taxes which reduces 
private resources, and the other is a positive one, investment in public capital 
(Aschauer, 1989).  
The rationale for a non-monotonic relationship is fairly simple: the 
growth rate increases with G up to a maximum level and then starts 
diminishing. One important target of public spending is to ameliorate growth 
performance by improving the marginal productivity of the private sector’s 
physical capital and labour. This is generally attained by providing a basic 
social and economic infrastructure, since this helps private investment and 
promotes growth. Assuming private maximizing behaviour, the marginal 
product of capital receives beneficial effects from additional services. At the 
same time there is a detrimental effect due to taxes, which makes individuals 
worse off.  
The optimal level of government infrastructure occurs when the marginal 
product of public infrastructure equals marginal social costs. Any public 
infrastructure beyond this level crowds out private investment, reduces the 
level of output and frictions growth. 
Following the main literature, we assume a permanent balanced 
government budget and rule out debt-financing of government spending 
(Fisher and Turnovsky, 1998). Public spending is financed by levying an 
average flat-rate tax on income τ (0 < τ < 1)  
(2) 21 GGGY +==⋅τ  
(3) GG ⋅= φ1 ;   ( ) GG ⋅−= φ12  
where G1 are traditional core productive expenditures, G2 are all others 
productive government  expenditures and φ (0 ≤ φ ≤ 1) is the share of G1 on 
total spending.  
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Public capital accumulation depends on total government revenues. 
Assuming equal depreciation rates δ  for different kinds of public capital, 
accumulation dynamics are defined by: 
(4) ;   11 GG KGK δφ −⋅=
o ( ) 22 1 GG KGK δφ −⋅−=o
and from eq. (2) we get: 
(5)  ( ) YKKKK GGGG ⋅=+++ τδ 2121 oo
where dots indicate time derivatives. If government sets φ = 1, then only 
accumulation of public capital of type 1 will be financed. For φ = 0, the 
government sets G1 = 0 and net growth of public capital will involve only 
capital of type 2.  
Equations (2)-(4) also show that, for a given φ, if government wants to 
raise investment in public capital it is necessary to augment the tax rate τ. The 
economy will benefit from increased public capital but it must support a 
greater fiscal burden, which subtracts resources from private firms. As long as 
public capital productivity is equal to private capital productivity, changes in 
fiscal policy will have neutral effects on overall production. By contrast, a 
trade-off between private and public capital productivity occurs and, given 
their different productivity, the effects of an expansion (reduction) in 
government spending will depend on the composition of expenditure. 
 
Capital accumulation and steady state equilibrium 
 
Private capital accumulation depends positively on the private savings 
ratio (sK) and total income, and negatively on the average tax rate. For 
simplicity we assume a depreciation ratio δ equal to that of public capital. 
(6)  ( ) PKP KYsK δτ −⋅−= 1o
Equation (6) assumes an exogenous private savings ratio. Since we 
concentrate on the productivity-enhancing role of the government, 
endogenisation of the savings ratio would simply make the analysis more 
tedious without providing additional useful information. 
All quantities can be expressed in terms of (technology-augmented) 
labour input, so that accumulation equations (4) and (6) become: 
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(7)  ( ) 11 GG kxnyk ⋅++−⋅⋅= δτφo
(8)  ( ) ( ) 22 1 GG kxnyk ⋅++−⋅⋅−= δτφo
(9)  ( ) ( ) PKP kxnysk ⋅++−⋅−= δτ1o
where lower case letters indicate variables divided by (L⋅E), n is the labour 
growth rate and x the labour-augmenting technological progress. Output per 
unit of technology-augmented labour is: 
(10)  21 21
γγα
GGP kkky =
Growth of public and private capital is bounded by the diminishing 
returns. We can then derive expressions for kP, kG1 and kG2 in the steady state, 
as a result of setting equal to zero equations (7), (8), and (9), given the 
production function (10): 
(11) 








sk KP ; 
(12) 










sk KG ; 
(13) 










sk KG  
where stars denote steady state values. 
Substituting (11) – (13) into (10) gives the long-run steady state output 
per unit of technology-augmented labour: 
(14) 








sy K  
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The steady state level of output is related to exogenous and endogenous 
factors, as well as to the elasticities in the production function. Exogenous 
factors are the private savings ratio (positively related), the rate of depreciation 
of capital inputs (negatively related), the rate of population growth and 
technological progress (negatively related). 
Endogenous factors are the public policy instruments: 1) the size of the 
government, expressed as the ratio of total government spending over total 
output, τ, and, 2) the allocation of the public budget to the accumulation of 
KG1 and KG2  expressed by φ  and 1- φ.  
Public policy instruments have ambiguous effects on the steady state level 
of output per worker. The term ( )ατ−1 in equation (14) represents a 
detrimental aspect of government spending, since only a fraction 1−τ of total 
output (i.e. the private agents disposable income) remains to influence 
production with elasticity α .  On the other hand a fraction τ of output is 
devoted to the creation of productive public capital. This latter positively 
influences total output at elasticity equal to γ1+γ2.  
Equation (14) supplies another interesting piece of information. Given 
the size of government, the composition of public spending plays a significant 
role in determining the level of output per worker. The level of output per 
worker and the share of government spending used for investment in public 
capital of type 1 (type 2), captured by the parameter φ (1-φ) are linked by a 
non-linear relationship. As long as γ1 ≠ γ2, an allocation of resources in favour 
of public capital with higher elasticity will raise the steady state level of output 
per worker. However this process of shifting public resources cannot be 
continued indefinitely due to the diminishing returns on public capital. 
 
 
Optimal fiscal policy and transitional dynamics 
 
In this section we examine the relationship between τ, φ and the level of 
income per capita in a dynamic framework. Equation (14) represents the level 
of income per unit of technology augmented labour in the steady state where 
the growth rate of y, kP, kG1, kG2 is zero. If the economy experiences a shock, 
transitional dynamics designed to reach a new equilibrium will be stimulated. 
Equilibrium will be reached after a transition period characterized by positive 
but declining growth rates. When this process ends the economy is in a new 
the steady state, the capital stock and output has reached levels at which the 
new rate of net investment is only sufficient to maintain a constant 
capital/labour ratio. 
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Log-linearising equations (7) - (9), and given the production function (10), 
we can write an expression for the growth rate of output per unit of labour 
(Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995):  
(15) 









where )1()( 21 γγαδβ −−−⋅++= nx  and y* is the steady state output 
per unit of labour determined by equation (14). 
Equation (15) shows that the rate of growth of output per unit of labour 
depends, negatively, on the level of y at time t (the convergence effect β), and, 
positively, on the level of y in the steady state.  
The growth rate during the transition is related to the policy instruments 
τ and φ in the same way in which we described above, where we illustrated the 
influence of policy on the steady state level of output per worker. In detail, 
government can influence the growth rate of y by determining the size of its 
intervention and the relative shares of the two kinds of expenditure, G1 and 
G2, which are committed to the accumulation of public capital KG1 and KG2. 
However, since the relationships between the rate of growth and τ and φ are 
non-monotonic, the influence of the effects of government policy is 
ambiguous, depending upon the current levels of τ and φ. 
Using equation (14), taking logs and rearranging equation (15), gives an 
expression for the average growth rate of y between the initial period 0 and 

























































−−= 1 . 
From equation (16) one can see that the government size and the 
allocation parameter φ have two effects on the growth rate. There is a positive 
effect, due to the productive role of public capital ( )ln(τ and )ln(φ ), and a 
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negative effect, due to collecting resources from the private sector ( )1ln( τ− ) 
and the (mis)allocation of government expenditures with different levels of 
productivity ( )1ln( φ− ). Taking derivatives with respect to τ and φ separately 





























Other things being equal, eq. (17) tells us that the optimum level of τ is 
determined by the ratio of public capital elasticities to the sum of private and 
public capital elasticities. It is clear that the higher the share of the 
contribution of public capital to overall production the higher should be 
government investment in order to maximize growth. 
In eq. (18), given the size of the government, the composition of public 
spending can be set at the optimum level determined by the ratio of elasticity 
of public capital of type 1 to the sum of public capital elaticities. Such a ratio 
determines the maximum growth rate during the transition to the steady state. 
It is worth noting that eq. (17) and eq. (18) also represent optimizing 
values for the steady state level of output per worker given by eq. (14). In this 
state in the long-run the transitional dynamics leave the economy with a 
growth rate determined by the rate of exogenous technological progress.  
However, and here we come to the essential point, the level of y* depends on 
fiscal policy.  
The model described above (eq. (16)) can easily be extended to allow n 
types of public capital to enter the production function which in an intensive 
form becomes: 






In such a case, the accumulation of public capital i (net of depreciation) is 
governed by YG ii ⋅⋅= τφ , ∀i , where . 1=∑n
i
iφ
As a consequence, the equation for the growth rate of the economy 



























































−−= 1 , and )1()( ∑−−⋅++= inx γαδβ .  
Note that this generalization does not alter the implications for the effects 
of government size;  n optimal conditions for the composition of public 








γφ ,  ∀i. 
3. DISCUSSION AND EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
To analyze the effects of fiscal policy on growth we describe some 
different scenarios. First, we consider φ as fixed and concentrate on the 
implications of a change in the size of the government. Second, given τ, we 
explore the growth effects of a policy aimed at redistributing public resources 
between two kinds of expenditures.  
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Case 1: optimal government size and growth:  
 
Equation (16) shows a U-inverted relationship between τ and economic 
growth. For a given φ the maximizing value of τ is determined by the relative 
magnitudes of private and public capital elasticities as an increasing function 
of the ratio  γ1+γ2  /α (eq (17)). 
The optimal level of government spending occurs when the marginal 
product of public capital equals marginal costs. Any public spending beyond 
this level crowds out private investment and reduces growth and the final level 
of output per worker. In other words, up to a certain point the distortional 
effects of tax are more than compensated for by the productive effects of 
public investment. As government grows, the detrimental effects of a high 
level of taxation prevail over productive effects. Further increases in τ will 
make the situation worse. 
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between goverment size and growth 
given by equation (16). When government size is below τopt the marginal 
product of public capital is above the marginal product of private capital. In 
this case the economy is not making full use of all public capital potentialities 
and so it will reach a lower level of steady state income per unit of labour after 
a transition period characterized by a lower rate of growth compared to the 
optimum. The opposite occurs for any τ > τopt .  
The shape of this relationship depends on both private and public capital 
elasticities. When private and public capital elasticities are such that α = γ1+γ2 
(curve 1) the optimal level of τ corresponds to an equal allocation of resources 
between the private and public sectors, i.e. τopt(1) = 0.5. When α ≠ γ1+γ2 the 
curve becomes skewed. For α > γ1+γ2 (curve 2) τopt(2) is smaller than 0.5. A 
level of τ above the value 0.5 (τopt(3)), would maximize the rate of growth 
when α < γ1+γ2 (curve 3).  
If τ lies between τopt(2) and τopt(1), as in the shadowed area, the final effect 
of an increase in the size of the government is ambiguous, depending on the 
relative values of α, γ1 and γ2. According to curve 2 government should reduce 
its size in order to achieve a higher growth rate, although not below the level 
τopt(2) determined by eq. (17). In such a case the diminishing returns on private 
capital become stronger than the diminishing returns on public capital, 
implying that private investment is less productive than public. By contrast, 
curves 1 and 3 suggest that an increase in government size would increase 
investments in public capital. However if τ grows beyond the maximizing 
level, the beneficial effect of an expanding fiscal policy will end up having a 
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detrimental effect on growth. Simingly, ambiguity occurs in the area between 





FIGURE 1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERMENT SIZE 
AND GROWTH: SCENARIOS FOR THREE ECONOMIES WITH 
(1) α = γ1+γ2, (2) α > γ1+γ2, AND (3) α < γ1+γ2. CURVES 
ARE BUILT ASSUMING α+γ1+γ2 CONSTANT ACROSS 
ECONOMIES. OPTIMAL SIZES OF THE GOVERNMENT, GIVEN 
BY EQ. (16)  ARE SUCH THAT: τOPT (1) < τOPT (2) < τOPT (3). 
ARROWS SHOWS ARRANGEMENTS TOWARDS OPTIMIAL  τ.  
 
 
Case 2: the optimal composition of public spending 
 
Similar reasoning can be used to describe the effect of a shift in the 
composition of public spending. From equation (16), given government size, 
the share of different kinds of expenditure in the public budget influences the 
growth rate of the economy during transition to the steady state and also the 
long run level of output per worker (eq (14)). The direction of the 
composition effect depends on two aspects: 1) relative elasticities of different 
kind of public capital γ1 and γ2, and 2) the actual share φ and 1-φ of 
government spending devoted to the accumulation of two different kinds of 
public capital.  
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Figure 2 shows three inverse U-shaped curves which relate φ to the 
growth rate of the economy. The curves represent different economies which 
differ from each other in their γ1/γ2 ratio. Respectively, country (1)  γ1 = γ2, 
country (2) is  γ1< γ2, and country (3)  γ1>γ2. 
Growth-maximizing values of φ can differ substantially across economies. 
When γ1 = γ2 the best composition of the public budget assigns equal 
resources to G1 and G2, occuring when φ = 0.5 (curve 2). The relationship 
between φ and the growth rate becomes asymmetrical when γ1 ≠ γ2. In detail, 
when γ1 < γ2 (curve 2) the maximizing level of φ is less than 0.5, which 
corresponds to a relative higher share of resources attributed to G2. The 





FIGURE 2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERMENT 
SPENDING COMPOSITION AND GROWTH: SCENARIOS FOR 
THREE ECONOMIES: (1) γ1=γ2, (2) γ1<γ2, AND (3) γ1>γ2. 
CURVES ARE BUILT ASSUMING γ1+γ2 IS CONSTANT ACROSS 
THE THREE COUNTRIES. OPTIMAL  SPENDING 
COMPOSITION DERIVES FROM EQ. (17). ARROWS SHOWS 








γφ +< ), an increment in G1, 
which implies an increase in KG1, results in a higher rate of growth for each 
economy even when γ1 < γ2. This is because at low levels KG1 exhibits high 
marginal returns relative to KG2. However beyond a certain limit, determined 
by eq. (18), there are decreasing returns to KG1. This reduces the advantages of 
investing in this kind of capital. In the shadowed area the final result of a shift 
in the composition of public expenditure is ambiguous, since the relative 
marginal capital contributions do not go in the same direction. Indeterminacy 




Since the resurgence of growth theory in the late 1980’s, a vast quantity of 
literature on empirical analysis of economic growth across countries has been 
published. Evidence of the good explanatory power of the neoclassical model 
has been supplied, once this incorporates crucial factors such as human capital 
(Mankiw et al, 1992), accumulation of technological know-how (Nonneman 
and Vanhoudt, 1996) and social capital (Temple and Johnson, 1998). In detail, 
the empirical specification of Mankiw et al. has been used as a starting point 
for studying the significance of fiscal policy variables for growth. However 
results have not supplied clear-cut evidence of the long run effects of 
government intervention on growth (Njikamp and Poot, 2004). 
The presence of a non-linear relationship between the growth rate and 
the government spending ratio on total output may explain the lack of 
conclusive results in empirical studies across countries (Kneller et al., 1999). 
Even under the restrictive assumption that different countries have similar 
elasticities of private and public capital, linear regressions are inadequate for 
explaining cross-country variations in government size and the growth rate 
(Barro, 1990; Slemrod, 1995).  
In our analysis figure 3 highlights this issue. It shows six economies, 
which for simplicity of analysis are assumed to have the same values of α and 
γ, and thus all lie on the same curve deriving from equation (16). Consequently 
these countries differ from each other in their government size and growth 
rate. Country 3 attains the optimizing value of τ. Economies 1 and 2 should 
increase public investment in order to improve growth and the level of output 
per worker. Countries 4 to 6 have oversized governments and thus should 
reduce public expenditure. However a linear regression on these countries 
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(AA) suggests that there is a negative relationship between the government 
size and the growth rate. This is clearly incorrect. Furthermore if all the 
countries optimized their government size, i.e. if they were all in the position 
of country 3, there would be no variation across observations and a linear 





FIGURE 3. LINEAR REGRESSION AND THE NON LINEAR 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT SIZE AND GROWTH. 
ECONOMIES 1 TO 6 HAVE SAME VALUES OF  α, γ1, AND γ2 BUT 
DIFFERENT τ AND GROWTH RATES. A LINEAR REGRESSION 
(AA) ACROSS THESE COUNTRIES WOULD SHOW A NEGATIVE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT SIZE AND THE RATE 
OF GROWTH. 
 
Allowing elasticities to vary across countries, an even more complex 
picture emerges. Figure 4 shows the relationship between government size and 
the growth rate for 4 different countries with equal α+γ1+γ2 and ratios 
121 ≥+γγα . Country 1 has a ratio 121 >+γγα , followed in declining 
order by country 2, country 3 and country 4.  
The line AA in figure 4 shows a situation of non-optimality. All countries 
should expand their government size in order to reach the maximizing level of 
τ, the optimum growth rate. However a linear regression of the growth rate on 
the current level of τ shows a negative relationship, suggesting that the size of 




FIGURE 4. LINEAR REGRESSION AND THE NON LINEAR 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT SIZE AND GROWTH. 
CURVES REPRESENT ECONOMIES 1, 2, 3, AND 4 ASSUMING 
α+γ1+γ2 CONSTANT ACROSS ECONOMIES, BUT DIFFERENT 
RATIOS α /γ1+γ2. IN PANEL A THE REGRESSION LINE (AA) 
HAS NEGATIVE SLOPE, WHILE ECONOMIES SHOULD RAISE 
THEIR τ TO MAXIMIZE GROWTH RATE. THE  OPPOSITE 
SITUATION OCCURS WHEN THEY LIE IN PANEL B 
(REGRESSION LINE BB). 
 
Conversely, if countries are positioned as shown on Panel B, a linear 
regression suggests a positive relationship between τ and the growth rate 
(regression line BB), while all countries have over-sized governments. Another 
situation occurs when all countries attain maximizing levels of τ. In such a 
case, linear regression indicates a negative relationship: governments ought to 
reduce their size while they should not move from their level. The same 
analysis applies for the case 121 <+γγα . Implications will be obviously the 
reverse. 
Neglecting the public budget structure represented by equation (2) would 
also give inconsistent estimates of the effect of public expenditure on growth. 
Most of empirical analyses across countries are based on Barro-type or 
Mankiw et al (1992) regressions, adding fiscal variables following an ad-hoc 
approach. Few attempts have been made to incorporate complete formulation 
of the government budget constraints into a model and test empirically the 
effect of different components of public spending on economic performance. 
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Again, results are not conclusive (Devarajan et al, 1996; Mittnik and 
Neumann, 2003). 
This analysis tries to tackle this issue by incorporating the differences in 
productive impacts across government functions. Even when each component 
has a positive impact on growth, as we assume, diminishing returns limit the 
benefit of increases in investment. Morover countries differ in the 
composition of government spending. 
Taking the government decision on τ as given, there remains the question 
of how to allocate public resources. Figure 5 shows the relationships between 
the growth rate and φ (the share of public capital of type 1) for three 





FIGURE 5. LINEAR REGRESSION AND THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN SHARE OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES φ, AND 
THE GROWTH RATE. IN PANEL A, THREE ECONOMIES WITH 
EQUAL γ1+γ2. PRESENT INCREASING LEVELS OF φ: THE 
REGRESSION LINE (AA) SUGGESTS A NEGATIVE 
RELATIONSHIP WITH GROWTH. IN PANEL B EACH ECONOMY 
HAS OVERSIZED LEVELS OF φ, REGRESSION LINE (BB) WHICH 




In Panel A positions 1, 2 and 3 represent values of φ that maximize the 
growth rate for each economy. In Panel B, positions 1’, 2’ and 3’ correspond 
to “too large” shares of investment in public capital of type 1. However, 
applying a linear regression of growth rates on the share of investments in KG1 
results in a negative relationship in Panel A and a positive one in Panel B.  
This suggests that even when the effect of a single component of the 
public budget (say, infrastructure) is found strongly positive, it is necessary to 
check for the effect of other public expenditure on growth before deciding to 
expand investment in infrastructure. Only after checking all components of 
public spending ought one decide how to re-allocate public resources. 
Apart from the peculiarities of the examples given above, the general 
conclusion of this work is that in randomly taken observations a linear 
regression is very unlikely to identify the real relationship between τ, φ and 
economic growth. Misleading results, which derive from the mis-specification 
of the model, are thus to be expected. Inclusion of both positive and negative 






This paper analyses the optimal size of government and the composition 
of public spending that maximise growth. We show that it is possible to 
optimise growth during the transition path to the steady state by controlling 
the size of the government and, also, the composition of government 
expenditure.  
The model considers two different categories of government spending. It 
allows public capital productivity to differ and assumes that all government 
investment positively affects the productivity of private factors. For a given 
structure of public spending the aim is to find the optimal spending level for 
maximising growth, reallocating resources between private and public capital 
according to their relative elasticity.  
In the same way, for a given level of public expenditure (which can be 
easily considered fixed in the short-medium term) the aim of the model is to 
find the optimal composition of public spending. Changes in the spending 
structure lead to different growth rates, depending on their relative elasticity 
and share. This should induce governments to redistribute budgets between 
less and more productive public capital to achieve the optimum balance, 
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thereby yielding stronger positive transitional growth effects than would 
otherwise be obtained. 
The economy in the long term is in the steady state where growth only 
depends on exogenous factors. However, this does not imply that fiscal policy 
is not important for long term economic performance. Fiscal policy has 
considerable influence on the levels of capital and output. In addition a 
transitional period of increased growth resulting from an optimal public 
spending can be rather long. As Barro e Sala−i−Martin (1995) suggest, at least 
five years are necessary to reach half of the transition, and if a broad concept 
of capital is used, this becomes 27 years. This highlights the need for short-
medium term analysis such as that in our work.  
Finally, the model has an important empirical implication which comes 
from the hypothesis of non-linearity between public spending and growth and 
from the effects of the composition of government spending. Studies on 
optimal tax rates should take into account all the effects that public capital has 
on the economy. To be more precise, an increase in public capital at the 
expense of private capital is likely to accelerate or brake the economic growth 
rate. The latter effect typically depends on the marginal product of public and 
private capital respectively. Studies on fiscal policy which postulate a 
monotonic relationship (either positive or negative) and merely add an  ad hoc 
government variable may well suffer from mis-specification and linear 
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